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WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1962
G. Robert Blakey*
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social
and industrial diseases. Publicity is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.
Louis D. Brandeis, Other Peoples' Money 92
A. THE GRowTi AND OPERATION OF
WELFARE AND PENSION FUNDs
Underlined by a dramatic shift in the character of our population, making
us both older and younger,1 private welfare and pension plans sought as an
alternative and a complement to Social Security have truly become mid-
century phenomena. Minimal until the early forties, these programs- involving
employee health, retirement, and death benefits - today number about 200,000,2
have total assets, including insurance reserves, of approximately 60 billion
dollars,' and cover directly or indirectly over one half of the population of the
United States.'
Unfortunately, the growth of these plans has been somewhat marred by
various abuses, ranging from inept management and questionable insurance
practices to outright bribery and embezzlement. Documented in detail by federa
* Trial Attorney, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division, Depart-
ment of Justice. A.B., University of Notre Dame, 1957; LL.B., Notre Dame Law School, 1960.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and should not, of course, be
attributed to the Department of Justice.
1 The rate of increase in the number of persons in both the youngest and oldest age
groups of the population between 1950 and 1960 was five times that of the groups in the inter-
mediate ages. Persons under 18 increased by 37% and the number 65 and over increased by
35%. The increase in the age group 18 to 64 was only 7%. THE WoaRn ALMANAC AND BooK
OF FACTS: 1962 at 251.
2 The Department of Labor estimated there were between 190,000 and 200,000 operating
welfare and pension plans in the United States in 1961. Hearings before the Special Subcom-
mittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 138(1961) [hereinafter cited as House 1961 Hearings]. In September 1962, the Department had on
file nearly 165,000 benefit plan descriptions, 8,000 of which were estimated to represent in-
active plans, and was receiving additional plan descriptions at the rate of approximately 10,000
per year. Address by Frank M. Kleiler, Director of the Department's Office of Welfare and
Pension Plans, at Denver, Colorado, Sept. 10, 1962, reprinted at 3 CCH LAB. LAW RPTR. 8111
(1962).
3 The Department of Labor estimated the 1961 value of these funds, including insurance
reserves, at around $58 billion. Hearings Before theSubcommittee on Labor of the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Senate 1961 Hearings].
4 Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Final Report on Welfare and Pension Plan Investigation, S. REP. No. 1734,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1956) [hereinafter cited as DOUGLAS REPORT]. See generally, Holland,
The Pension Climate, N.Y.U. 10TH ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 1 (1957). Although the Committee
made the estimate in 1956, there is no reason to assume the picture has changed.
5 Federal investigations of employee benefit funds go back to 1954. The 83rd, 84th and
85th Congresses conducted, on varying scales, such investigations. S. REP. No. 1440, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1958). The DOUGLAS REPORT is perhaps the most comprehensive study
published on the federal level.
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and state6 investigations, the political pressures stemming from the exposure
of these abuses soon produced some state legislation,' and, on the federal level,
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958.8 Few people were
satisfied with the 1958 Act, however, and its passage by no means dissipated
the pressure for reform on the federal level. In fact, a drive to amend the
statute began with the presidential message approving it. On March 20, 1962,
that drive culminated when President Kennedy signed Public Law 87-420, the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act Amendments of 1962.?
Many factors - economic, social, medical and legal - have contributed
to the phenomenal growth of the benefit plan. During the later part of the
nineteenth century a number of unions established benefit programs for their
own members, and certain enlightened employers also established pension or
profit-sharing plans." At this time, however, many union leaders were hostile
toward employer financed plans, seeing them as a departure from traditional
union goals of better wages, hours, and working conditions." The tremendous
growth of welfare and pension plans which has occurred in the last half century
did not begin, then, until the early 1940's. Events during the depression days
of the early and late thirties convincingly demonstrated that the husbandry
of an individual is unimpressive compared with the various sources of insecurity
which the economy foists upon him. 2 A series of legal developments then occurred
which made the benefit plan particularly attractive.' High corporate taxes
during and after World War II and the Korean conflict, coupled with the
allowability of deductions for contributions to these programs under the Revenue
Act of 1942,"4 made their establishment feasible at a relatively low net cost.
Wage stabilization programs during this same period froze wages but permitted
increased employee compensation where it took the form of a "fringe" benefit.'
6 See, e.g., STATE OF NEW YORK INs. DEPT., PRIVATE EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS-A
PUBLIC TRUST (1956).
7 Six states have enacted legislation aimed specifically at the welfare and pension fund.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151D, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1961); N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 60-75; N.Y. INS.
LAW §§ 37-37(q); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 48.52.010-.080 (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§
211.01-.17 (Supp. 1962); 'CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-78 to -89 (1960). California's law
expired June 30, 1960. 'Cal. Stats. 1957, ch. 2167, § 1, at 3841. See Note, 34 NOTRE DAMeE
LAWYER 403-17 (1959).
8 72 Stat. 997 (1958).
9 76 Stat. 35 (1962), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-09 (Supp. 1962). Hereinafter the amended
Act will be referred to by section number only.
10 STAFF OF SUBCOMIA. ON WELFARE AND PENSION FUNDS, SENATE COMM. ON LABOR
AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 84th Cong., Ist Sess., INTERIM REPORT WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN
INVESTIGATION 3-6 (1956).
11 Dubinsky, Safeguarding Union Welfare Funds, American Federationist, July 1954, p. 10
(reprinted 100 CONG. REQ. 10318 (1954)).
12 See Tilove, Social and Economic Implications of Private Pensions, 14 IND. & LAB. REL.
REV. 24 (1961).
13 DOUGLAS REPORT at 12.
14 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 165, added by ch. 619, § 162, 56 Stat. 862 (1942) (now INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401).
15 Exec. Order No. 9250, 7 Fed. Reg. 7871 (1942), froze wages. See AARON, THE EM-
PLOYMENT RELATION AND THE LAW 694 (1957). The National War Labor Board subsequent-
ly decided fringe benefits were not illegal increases in wages, and employers quickly took
advantage of the decision. See Neenan, Pension Funds and the Equity Market, 7 LAB. L.J.
552 (1956).
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The whole question took on a collective bargaining character, moreover, after
the Taft-Hartley Act was construed to require good faith bargaining on the
issue."
Today welfare plans provide workers and their dependents with such
benefits as group life insurance, disability payments, medical care, and accidental
death, dismemberment and unemployment compensation. Modem pension plans,
on the other hand, provide for profit sharing or retirement benefits. Statistics
relating to pension plans indicate they have grown from approximately 2,000
in 1940" to a now estimated 25,000.8 Welfare funds have experienced a
similar growth.19 Total contributions to both types of plans amounted in 1959
to 10.2 billion dollars, and benefits paid to 5.5 billion dollars.2" It is estimated,
moreover, that their total assets, now around 60 billion dollars, will continue
to grow until by the end of the decade they will amount to 100 billion dollars.21
The significance of these funds is further illustrated by the sobering observation
that by 1954 uninsured corporate pension funds alone purchased more common
and preferred stock than such financial giants as the life insurance companies,
property and liability insurance companies, and open-end investment com-
panies.
22
The welfare and pension plan transcends the narrow confines of labor-
management problems. Union representatives actually participate in the admin-
istration of plans covering only a few employees.23 A slight majority of all
employees, moreover, are covered by plans which were not even the product
of collective bargaining.24
The method by which the plans' benefits are financed varies greatly from
plan to plan. Some plans are noncontributory, i.e., the benefits are under-
written solely by the employer. Other plans are contributory, i.e., both the
employer and the employee jointly finance the plan. Finally, a few plans are
supported entirely by the employees. Retirement plans tend to be noncontrib-
utory and welfare plans contributory.2"
16 Inland Steel Company, 77 N.L.R.B. 1, aff'd, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). The Board found the term "wages," over which employers
were required to bargain in good faith, included pension and insurance benefits, which would
accrue to employees out of their employment. Accord, W. W. Cross & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 174
F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949). It is ordinarily now an unfair labor practice to institute, General
Motors Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949); revoke, Cummer-Graham Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 722
(1950); or modify, Tide Water Associated Oil 'Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949), a benefit plan
without first notifying the employee organization.
17 DOUGLAS REPORT at 13.
18 House 1961 Hearings at 45.
19 The growth of welfare funds is, more or less, reflected in the growth of group insurance.
See DOUGLAS REPORT at 13.
20 House 1961 Hearings at 45.
21 Senate 1961 Hearings at 8.
22 S. REP. No. 1280, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1955).
23 92% of the welfare plans and 86% of the pension plans are unilaterally employer ad-
ministered. Only 7% of the welfare and 13% of the pension funds are jointly administered.
The rest are unilaterally union administered. DOUGLAS R EPORT at 14.
24 See S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1958). The Douglas Committee esti-
mated in 1956 that approximately 60% of the workers covered -for pension benefits and about
40% of those covered by welfare programs were under a plan which had been collectively bar-
gained. DOUGLAS REPORT at 12.
25 S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1958).
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While important, the source of the financing is not as significant as the
method of its management. Here plans are either funded or unfunded. The
unfunded plan meets current liabilities on a pay as you go basis, making no
attempt to provide for future obligations.2" On the other hand, the funded
plan makes such an attempt, as the term implies, by setting up a separate fund.
Depending on the type of administration, contributions are made to admin-
istrators or joint trustees who in turn either manage the corpus themselves2 7
or negotiate an insurance contract to underwrite the fund's liabilities.2" Most
welfare plans are insured with a commercial carrier or on a Blue Cross or
Blue Shield basis.2 Pension plans, on the other hand, tend to be self-insured.
While the vast majority of the various programs have had excellent admin-
istration, many plans have become a "hunting ground of the unscrupulous.""
More irregularities and perhaps a higher incidence of abuses have occurred in
the jointly administered funds.2 ' Abuses, on the other hand, have been un-
covered in all types of plans.3 2 They have ranged from embezzlement to simple
bad bookkeeping."2 The investment of the corpus and selection of the insurance
carrier, however, have been the critical areas of fund administration where
most of the more serious abuses have occurred. Intense competition associated
with group coverage has resulted in high commissions and service fees to
"influential" persons performing no services, kickbacks to trustees, and "switch-
ing" among carriers to obtain the higher first year commission. On the other
hand, while self-insured funds have been relatively free from criticism, it is clear
that access to these funds for investment purposes has often depended upon
a willingness to kick back part of the broker's fee to the administrator or fund
trustee. Kickbacks in this area, moreover, have increasingly taken on highly
sophisticated forms.3 4 Although some action on the state and federal level has
been taken to deal with these abuses, the need to surround these funds with
more than token protection has been recognized for some time.
B. WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1958
Following the submission of the final report of the Douglas Committee in
1956, a number of bills were introduced in the Eighty-Fourth and Eighty-Fifth
Congresses, designed to deal with the abuses uncovered by the committee's
26 Of the 118,660 welfare and pension plans reporting under the 1958 Act only 5,460
welfare and 1,470 pension plans were unfunded. House 1961 Hearings at 44.
27 2,070 reporting welfare plans out of a total of 94,530 and 13,090 pension plans out of
a total of 24,130 were self-insured. Id. at 44. Unsettled is the question whether these plans
are "insurance" within state regulatory statutes. See, e.g., Note, Employee Welfare Plans, 31
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 276 (1956).
28 85,850 reporting welfare plans and 7,130 pension plans were insured. House 1961
Hearings at 44.
29 S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1958).
30 DOUGLAS REPORT at 6.
31 Id. at 7.
32 An excellent summary of the Douglas Committee's findings can be found in the state-
ment of Senator Douglas in support of the 1962 amendments. 108 CONG. REC. 1761-83 (daily
ed. Feb. 7, 1962).
33 Inadequate records seem to be an almost universal finding of both state and federal in-
vestigations. See, e.g., Senate 1961 Hearings at 174.
34 See S. REP. No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1961).
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investigation. 5 Not a single Congressman or Senator during the extensive debate
in both houses argued against the existence of some federal responsibility. Debate
instead centered on coverage of employer managed "level of benefit" plans.3 "
A general understanding, however, was reached between the Administration
and Democratic leaders to include all funds, and this was more or less finally
embodied in S. 2888, known as the Douglas bill, which, accompanied by Senate
Report No. 1440, was favorably reported to the Senate, unanimously adopted,
and referred to the Committee on Education and Labor in the House."7
Embodying a policy of wide disclosure, S. 2888's coverage, based on both
the commerce and the taxing power, was virtually as broad as Congress's power
to legislate. Administrators of all types of plans were required to register and
file annual reports with the Secretary of Labor, which were to be made available
to beneficiaries and other interested parties. The Secretary was authorized to
issue regulations, make appropriate investigations and studies, and have civil
compliance suits filed in his behalf. Criminal penalties were provided for false
statements, embezzlement, bribery, and willful violations of the Act.
The unanimous approval given by the Senate made it appear that S. 2888
would be the bill. Just a month before the Eighty-Fifth Congress adjourned,
however, H.R. 13507 was introduced by Congressman Teller of New York,
and shortly thereafter, accompanied by House Report No. 2283, was favorably
reported to the House. s H.R, 13507 differed from S. 2888 primarily in the
powers to be given to the Secretary of Labor and in its criminal provisions.
The Secretary's role was reduced to that of a custodian." Under the view that
existing criminal statutes were adequate,"0 enforcement of the statute was left
to the beneficiaries themselves, although a willful failure to comply with the
filing provisions of the Act was made criminal. After the passage of H.R. 13507
by a voice vote,4 the text of H.R. 13507 was substituted for S. 2888, and a
conference with the Senate was requested.
What emerged from the conference committee was largely H.R. 13507.
Apparently it Was H.R. 13507 or no bill at all.2 Senator Kennedy, although
dissatisfied, recommended acceptance of the conference report 3 to insure the
passage of some legislation. 4 4 Why the House members were so adamant in
their opposition to S. 2888 does not appear on the record. However, as William
35 The major bills introduced were S. 1122 by Douglas (IIl.), S. 1145 and S. 2175 by
Smith (N. J.), S. 1813 by Goldwater (Ariz.), and S. 2137 by Allot (Colo.). See Hearing be-
fore the Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Plans Legislation of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-22 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Senate 1957
Hearings].
36 The distinction between the so-called "level of benefit" and the "fixed cost" plan occu-
pied much of the debate on the original Act. It is no longer significant. Both types are now
included in the Act. The views of the spokesmen for both sides of the controversy are set out
in detail in S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
37 104 CONG. REc. 6886 (daily ed. April 29, 1958).
38 104 CONG. REc. 14037 (daily ed. July 28, 1958).
39 104 CONG. REC. 15053 (daily ed. August 6, 1958).
40 Id. at 15057 (daily ed. August 6, 1958).
41 Id. at 15075 (daily ed. August 6, 1958).
42 104 CONG. Rxc. 16512 (daily ed. August 16, 1958).
43 H. R. REP. No. 2656, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). The Report was agreed to by the
House on August 19, 104 CONG. REc. 16951 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1958).
44 The Senate agreed to the Report on August 16. 104 CONG. REc. 16513 (daily ed.
Aug. 16, 1958).
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Isaacson has observed: "One need not be a cynic to suspect that strong political
pressures, not wholly apparent in the debate, manifested themselves in the final
results."45 Not being able to prevent the passage of all legislation it was
guaranteed that what did pass would be ineffective.
On August 28, President Eisenhower reluctantly signed the bill.46 He did
so solely because it established "a precedent of Federal responsibility," and
noted it would "require extensive amendment at the next session of the Con-
gress. '"' A drive to amend the statute thus began with the presidential message
approving it.
C. THE 1962 AMENDMENTS
Although the President's criticism was followed by some action, 8 the drive
did not begin in earnest until Congressman Powell of New York, the new chair-
man of the House Education and Labor Committee, introduced H.R. 4929
during the first session of the Eighty-Seventh Congress.4" On May 19, 1961,
the new Administration followed suit and sent its proposals to Congress.5" Hear-
ings were held in late May and early June before a House Education and
Labor Special Subcommittee chaired by Congressman Roosevelt of California.51
A Senate Labor and Public Welfare subcommittee, headed by Senator' Mc-
Namara of Michigan, held a single day of hearings in July.52 Both the House
and the Senate full committees made substantial changes in the original
proposals. H.R. 8723 and S. 2520, embodying these modifications, were respec-
tively both introduced" and reported to the House and Senate on August 18"'
and September 8."
Favorable action did not come, however, until the second session of
Congress. Following the President's economic message, which again emphasized
the need for the amendments, the House56 and the Senate" on February 6,
1962, took up respectively H.R. 8723 and S. 2520. Debate in both chambers
lasted only two days. The principal opposition in the Senate came from Senator
45 Isaacson, Employee Welfare and Pension Plans: Regulation and Protection of Employee
Rights, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 96 (1959).
46 104 'CONG. REC. APP. A. 8373 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1958).
47 N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1958, p. 16, col. 1 and 2.
48 Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, for example, introduced S. 567 on January 20,
1959, to "restore teeth" to the Act. 105 CONG. REC. 834 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1959). Secretary
of Labor Mitchell also issued in August 1960 a highly critical report on the first 18 months'
administration of the Act. See 107 CONG. Rac. 7468 (daily ed. May 15, 1961).
49 107 CONG. REc. 2559 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1961).
50 See S. REP. No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-13 (1961). The proposals were intro-
duced in the Senate as S. 1944, 107 CONG. REc. 8013 (daily ed. May 23, 1961), and in the
House as H. R. 7234 and H. R. 7235, 107 CONG. Rec. 8004 (daily ed. May 22, 1961).
51 See Note 2 supra.
52 See Note 3 supra.
53 H. R. 8723 was introduced in the House by Congressman Smith on August 15, 1961.
107 CONG. Rae. 14805 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1961). S. 2520 was reported as an original bill by
the Committee on Education and Labor. 107 CONG. REc. 17499 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1961).
54 107 CONG. REc. 15253 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1961). H. R. 8723 was accompanied by
H. R. REP. No. 998, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
55 107 CONG. Rac. 17499 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1961). S. 2520 was accompanied by S. REP.
No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
56 Debate was conducted pursuant to House Resolution 538 under which the House
resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union to consider
H. R_ 8723. 108 CONG. Rc. 1557 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1962).
57 Debate was conducted under a unanimous consent agreement. 108 CONG. REC. 1662
(daily ed. Feb. 6, 1962).
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Tower of Texas. He felt that the legislation was not needed, but, if it was to
pass, its administration should be entrusted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission instead of the Department of Labor." Opposition in the House
was also vocal, led by Congressman Goodell of New York. Primarily, however,
it took the form of a demand that certain amendments be accepted before
passage, not that no bill should be enacted. Unfortunately, although some of
the amendments unquestionably made the final product better legislation, many
of them manifested a profound distrust in the Office of the Secretary of Labor
and the Department itself. While Senator Tower had little success in the Senate,"9
Congressman Goodell secured the acceptance of a number of his suggestions.
On February 7 both Houses passed their respective bills; the Senate by a
voice vote, and the House by a vote of 191 to 85.60
After a procedural entanglement was straightened out, a conference was
requested and conferees were appointed. By March 12 agreement was reached
and a formal report was filed in the House." On March 15, the Senate
approved the report, again by a voice vote.62 After defeating a motion to
recommit the bill, aptly described by Congressman O'Hara as an attempt to
defeat the whole bill "by raising a totally extraneous issue,"6 the House adopted
the report by a vote of 284 to 108.64 President Kennedy gave the bill final
approval on March 20.
D. ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDED ACT
The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 received at that
time little critical comment. For this reason, the following analysis will not be
limited to the 1962 Amendments.
Finding and Policy: Section 2 (29 U.S.C.A. § 301)
The amended Act retains the original finding and policy statement. Briefly,
they note the growth of the benefit plan and acknowledge the need to protect
the security of the various participants by requiring full and adequate disclosure
of the financial affairs of the various plans.
Definitions: Section 3 (29 U.S.C.A. § 302)
The amended Act also retains most of the original definitions. They give
58 108 CONG. REc. 1753-54 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962). Senator Tower's amendment which
would have transferred the administration of the Act to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission was defeated 57 to 25. Id. at 1759. The Senator also proposed an amendment which
would have exempted all plans having fewer than one hundred participants. It was also de-
feated 57 to 25. Id. at 1750.
59 It is interesting to note that Senator Tower's main arguments were drawn from a letter
written from Archibald Cox, then a professor of law, to the then Senator from Massachusetts,
John F. Kennedy. 108 'CONG. REc. 1753 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962). The letter is reprinted in
full in Senate 1957 Hearings at 651-54. The Senate originally considered and rejected this
proposal in 1958, largely because the Commission itself was reluctant to undertake administra-
tion of the Act. S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1958). This reluctance was
reiterated in 1962. 108 CONG. REC. 1756-57 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962).
60 108 CONG. REc. 1784 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962); id. at 1850.
61 108 CONG. REc. 3481 (daily ed. March 12, 1962).
62 108 CONG. REc. 3859 (daily ed. March 15, 1962).
63 Id. at 3899.
64 Id. at 3903.
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technical meaning to such terms as "employee welfare benefit plan" and "em-
ployee organization." Although no change in substance was intended,6 5 to avoid
possible misunderstandings "industry or activity affecting commerce" was re-
defined to parallel the definition in the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA).66 A new definition for "party in interest"
was also added; its significance will be noted below in connection with section
7(f)(1)(C).
Coverage: Section 4 (29 U.S.C.A. § 303)
Although an attempt was made to rewrite the constitutional basis of the
Act along the lines of the original Douglas bill,67 the only changes which were
made did little 'hore than clarify the original intent of the section. Plans estab-
lished by employers or employee organizations in industries affecting commerce
are made subject to the Act. Four special categories of plans, however, are
totally exempt: (1) where the administration is by a governmental unit, (2)
where the plan was established solely to comply with workmen's compensation
legislation, (3) where the administration is by a tax exempt fraternal benefit
society not representing its members in collective bargaining, or (4) where the
plan covers not more than 25 participants.
Duty of Disclosure and Reporting: Section 5 (29 U.S.C.A. § 304)
Under the Act as previously written the "administrator" - defined as the
individual or individuals designated or actually in ultimate control of the assets
of the plan- was required to publish as specified by section 5: (1 ) a descrip-
tion, and (2) an annual financial report of the plan. Unfortunately, Professor
Patterson's cogent criticism of the definition of "administrator" was not heeded.6"
The ambiguity which results when the language is applied to plans such as the
Ford Motor Company's, negotiated in September 1958, remains.69 The problem
is not insolvable, however, since careful draftsmanship in any plan can include
a "designated person," and section 5(a) now provides that the Secretary of
Labor can give authoritative advice in otherwise doubtful situations.
The description and report must now contain the information required
by sections 6 and 7 "in such form and detail as the Secretary [of Labor] shall
by regulations prescribe."7 The Secretary is also given broad power to prescribe,
after notice and hearing, other periods or modes of publication where the
required information cannot be practicably ascertained, made available, or
would, if published, be duplicative or uninformative.7
65 S. REp. No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1961).
66 73 Stat. 520, 29 U.S.C. § 402(c) (Supp. III, 1962).
67 See text following note 37 supra. S. 1944 and H. R. 7234 and H. R. 7235 all contained
an alternative on which coverage would be obtained.
68 House 1961 Hearings at 67.
69 PATTERSON, LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PENSION EXPECTATIONS 105-06 (1960).
70 Section 5(a). The need for interpretative regulations is perhaps best illustrated by the
testimony of former Secretary Goldberg that the Department of Labor received 27,000 inquiries
into the meaning of the Act in only two and one-half years. Senate 1961 Hearings at 10.
71 The Secretary has issued regulations governing procedures for application, consideration
and decision concerning petitions for a variation as to the manner or period of publishing
descriptions or annual reports under § 5(a) of the Act. 27 Fed. Reg. 5742 (1962), adding 29
C.F.R. §§ 1303.1-.20.
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Description of the Plan: Section 6 (29 U.S.C.A. § 305)
Ninety days after the establishment of a welfare or pension plan a descrip-
tion must be published under section 8. The description must contain: the
name and address of the administrator; his official position under the plan;
his relation, if any, to the employer or employee organization; other offices or
positions held by him; the name, address and description of the plan and its
type of administration; the schedule of benefits; the names, titles and addresses
of trustees other than administrators; if the plan is mentioned in a collective
bargaining agreement; copies of the plan itself or other instruments, if any,
under which it was established and operates; the sources of financing and the
identity of any organization throngh which benefits are provided; the details
of the basis on which the records of the plan are kept; and the procedures for
presenting and appealing claims. Under the Act as now amended any change
in this information must be reported to the Secretary within. sixty days after
it becomes effective.
Annual Reports: Section 7 (29 U.S.C.A. § 306)
(a) Duty to file
All administrators of benefit plans required to file descriptions also had
to file annual reports under the old Act. Now, under a Senate amendment,
only plans covering one hundred or more participants must file the annual
report. Plans covering fewer than one hundred must still file the description
and comply with the various other provisions of the Act as amended; 2 they
are also subject to the new criminal provisions.73 The 100 participant exemption
was included at the suggestion of the insurance industry.74 It will have the effect,
in all likelihood, of excluding 60 to 70 per cent of the plans subject to the Act,
although fewer than 5 to 7 per cent of the employees covered by all plans
will be affected." From an administrative viewpoint, it seems to be a worth-
while improvement. The Secretary may, moreover, require, after investigation,
even these plans to file the annual report.
All annual reports must be published as required under section 8 within
150 days of the end of the plan's record (calendar or fiscal) year. The Act
formerly required the report within 120 days; the thirty-day extension was also
added at the suggestion of the insurance industry.'
(b) Basic information
The report must be signed by the administrator and include the following
information: the amount contributed by each employer and by the employees;
the amount of the benefits paid or furnished; -the number of employees covered;
a'statement of assets specifying the total amount of cash, Government bonds,
72. Administrators of such plans are required to file, within 150 days after the end of the
plan's record year, an identification of the plan and information relating to the greatest num-
ber of participants covered by the plan at any one time during the reporting year. If at
any time during the year more than 100 are covered, the annual report exemption does not
apply. 27 Fed. Reg. 10291 (1962), adding 29 C.F.R. §§ 1304.3-.4.
73 S. REP. No. 908, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1961).
74 House 1961 Hearings at 263.
75 Id. at 270.
76 Id. at 263.
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non-Government bonds and debentures, common stocks, preferred stocks, com-
mon trust funds, real estate loans and mortgages, operated real estate, other
real estate, and other assets; a statement of liabilities, receipts, and disburse-
ments of the plan; and a detailed statement of the salaries, fees and commissions
charged to the plan.
Largely out of deference to the objections of several large corporations,"
neither the 1962 amendments nor the original Douglas bill required full dis-
closure of the assets and liabilities of the various plans. Despite the forceful
testimony of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 7 the argument was ad-
vanced that to do so would harm the plan's competitive position in the capital
market. For this reason, the original Act only required a "summary" statement
of assets, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements. Although under the amended
Act the term "summary" is omitted, there is no radical change in the character
of the reports the Secretary will receive. Optional reporting forms, which were
prepared by the Secretary in 1958, set out the "summary statement" in about
the same detail as the amended Act now requires.71
The 1962 amendments, however, perpetuate a far more significant dis-
closure "loophole." Only a detailed statement of the salaries, fees and com-
missions charged to the plan must be reported. A finder's fee, for example, paid
by an individual who obtains a loan from the plan need not be reported. Such
fees sometimes cloak a kickback to a fund trustee. It is often an easy matter "to
arrange" to borrow enough to cover both your need and the finder's fee to be
paid to the broker, who will in turn split the payment with a fund trustee.
The information in the report must be sworn to by the administrator or
certified by an independent certified or licensed public accountant. Such a
certificate must be based on a "comprehensive audit" conducted in accordance
with accepted auditing standards, although the audit need not include the
books or records of a bank, insurance company, or other institution where
they are subject to examination by any federal or state agency. The phrase
"comprehensive audit" is another example of the ambiguous draftsmanship
found in the original Act. It has no established meaning, and, in fact, it could
mean anything from an examination made in accordance with "generally
accepted auditing standards" (where the extent of the audit will vary with
the effectiveness of the internal controls and other circumstances) to a "detailed
audit" (where all accounts and transactions are examined without any use of
testing). s ° Fortunately, the Secretary will now be able to clarify the issue by
regulation.
A certification is made mandatory prior to a section 9(d) investigation
where a possible violation of section 7 is involved.81 The requirement does not
77 See Senate 1957 Hearings at 318-19. See also HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECO-
NOMIC POWER 81-83 (1959).
78 See Senate 1957 Hearings at 120.
79 See House 1961 Hearings at 128-29. Over 99% of the plans which complied with the
1958 Act, moreover, used the forms prepared by the Secretary of Labor. Id. at 95.
80 See Christensen, Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure, The Journal of Accountancy,
August 1961, p. 49-50.
81 See S. REP. No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1961).
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obtain, however, if the administrator refuses to secure it. 2 The Secretary may
also require prior to such an investigation the filing of a schedule of assets and
liabilities. The legislative history of the provision clearly indicates, however,
that such schedules should be sparingly requested.83 When it is requested, more-
over, the information in the schedule is exempted from the public information
provisions of section 10.84
(c) The unfunded plan
Where the plan in unfunded, it is only necessary to include in the annual
report the total benefits paid, the average number by year of eligible employees
during the preceding five years, and where applicable, a statement that the
plan is underwritten solely by the general assets of the employer.
(d) The insured plan
Where some or all of the benefits paid under a particular plan are under-
written by an insurance carrier or other organization, information in addition
to that required by subsection (b) must be filed. The report must include:
(1) the premium rate, the total premium paid to each such carrier, and the
approximate number of persons covered by each class of such benefits; and
(2) the total premiums received, the approximate number of persons covered
by each class of benefits, and the total claims paid by such carrier. The report
must also include the dividends or retroactive rate adjustments, commissions
and administrative service or other fees, or other specific acquisition cost paid
by the carrier; amounts held to provide benefits after retirement; the remainder
of such premiums; and the names and addresses of the brokers or other persons
to whom commissions or fees were paid, and also the amount and purpose of
such fees. Where the carrier does not maintain separate experience records on
the specific groups it serves, the repdrt may include only the basis of its
premium rate, the total amount of premiums received from the plan, and
a copy of the carrier's financial report; it still must note in detail, however,
specific costs incurred in the acquisition or retention of any particular plan.
(e) Investments by welfare benefit plans
Where the welfare benefit plan retains or invests funds, the details must
be reported in the same fashion, outlined below, as pension plans funded
through a trust.
(f) Employee pension benefit plans
Employee pension benefit plans must report certain information in addition
to the "applicable" information required by the foregoing subsections. Fortunate-
ly, the Secretary can now specify what is applicable, so the potential reporting
discrepancies under the old Act no longer exist.
Where the plan is funded through a trust, it must include- in its report
the type and basis of funding, actuarial assumptions used, the amount of
current and past service liabilities, and the number of retired and nonretired
employees covered. It must also include a statement of assets as required by
subsection (b) above, which may be evaluated either on the basis used in report-
82 Id. at 9.
83 108 CONG. REc. 1560 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1962).
84 H. R. REP. No. 998, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1962). See also 108 CONG. REc. 1843(daily ed. Feb. 6, 1962).
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ing the fund to the Secretary of the Treasury for tax exemptions or the aggregate
cost or present value, whichever is lower. The report must include further a de-
tailed list (including cost, present value and percentage of total) of all investments
in the employer, employee organizations or other "parties in interest." Under
the old Act only officers, trustees and employees of the fund were considered
"parties in interest." Now the phrase has been given a technical definition and
it includes broadly persons associated with: (1) the plan, (2) the employer,
(3) the employer organization, and (4) individuals providing benefit plan
services to the plan. But where the investments are: (1) in securities listed
and traded on an exchange subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission; or (2) of an investment company registered under Investment
Company Act of 1940; or (3) of a public utility holding company registered
under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935; and (4) the assets
statement notes the total investments in common and preferred stock, bonds,
and debentures, valued as noted above, the identity of such securities and the
fees and commissions incidental to their purchase and sale need not be reported.
A detailed list of all loans made to the employer, employee organization, or
other "party in interest" must also be included in the report. To the degree
that the investments of the trust are in insurance or annuity contracts, however,
the report need only include the information noted below, which is applicable
to funding through insurance carriers.
Where the plan is funded through an insurance company contract, the
report must include: The type and basis of funding, actuarial assumptions
used to determine contract payments, and the number of retired and non-
retired employees covered. It must also include the amount of current and
past service liabilities based on the actuarial assumptions (except for benefits
completely guaranteed by the carrier) and the amount of all accumulated
reserves.
Where the plan is unfunded, the report need only include total benefits
paid per year to retired employees for the past five years.
(g) Insurance carrier certification
Insurance carriers must certify, under the amended Act, to the plans with
which they deal, within 120 days after the end of each policy year, such
information determined by the Secretary of Labor to be necessary for the
administrators to comply with the above reporting requirements." Similar
certification was not required under the old Act.
(h) Simplified reports
The amended Act also provides that the Secretary of Labor may provide
by general rule simplified reports for plans which he finds would be unduly
burdened if they were required to file detailed reports each year. The old Act
did not contain such a provision. The privilege of filing such reports, however,
may be revoked where the Secretary finds the purposes of the Act would
thereby be served.
85 The Secretary has provided by regulation that carriers shall certify to plan administra-
tors the information specified in § 7(d) (2) of the Act, plus, in the case of employee pension
benefit plans, that specified in § 7(f) (2). 27 Fed. Reg. 5742 (1962), adding 29 C.F.R. §§
1302.1-.6.
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Publication: Section 8 (29 U.S.C.A. § 307)
Publication of the plan description and annual report must be made to
both participants and beneficiaries. Administrators must make copies of both
available for examination in the principal office of the plan. They must, more-
over, where written demand is made, send to the last known address of a
requesting participant or beneficiary a copy of the description and an "adequate
summary" of the latest annual report. Under the Act before amendment, only
a "summary" report was required. Presumably now the Secretary will decide
what constitutes an "adequate" summary.
Administrators must further file two copies of the description, and annual
report with the Secretary, who must make them available in the public document
room of the Department of Labor; the Secretary is also empowered under this
section to prepare forms for the description and annual reports, 6 and use of
the forms prescribed for these purposes has been made mandatory by regulation.
Reports Made Public Information: Section 10 (29 U.S.C.A. § 308(a))
As it was originally proposed, 7 section 10, an entirely new provision, was
based on its counterpart in the L.M.R.D.A.5 Congressman Goodell, however,
secured a modification in the language, not intended to alter substance but
designed to insure that the Secretary would only publish the data obtained from
the description and annual report, although the section terms it public infor-
mation, where to do so would protect the interests of the participants and
beneficiaries. 9
Retention of Records: Section 11 (29 U.S.C.A. § 308(b))
Section 11, another entirely new provision, is also based on its counterpart
in the L.M.R.D.A. 0 It provides that persons required to file descriptions and
annual reports must keep for five years adequate records to support the infor-
mation contained in the documents filed.
The combined effect of sections 10 and 11, like their, counterparts in the
L.M.R.D.A.9 will probably be to bring into play the rule of Shapiro v. United
States2 should a grand jury or the Secretary's civil investigators be denied
access to such records under a plea of the fifth amendment by an individual.
It is clear, of course, that corporations93 and unions94 may not invoke the
86 Section 8(b); implemented by regulations: 29 C.F.R. § 2.4, (Supp. 1962); 27 Fed.
Reg. 4964 (1962), reissuing 29 C.F.R. § 2.11. The latter makes mandatory the use of forms
prescribed by the Secretary for filing descriptions and annual reports. Venue for a criminal
failure to file "with the Secretary of Labor" would probably lie only in the District of Colum-
bia. See Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961).
87 See, e.g., S. 2520, section 10.
88 73 Stat. 528, 29 U.S.C. § 435(a) (Supp. III, 1962).
89 108 CONG. REc. 1842-43 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962).
90 73 Stat. 529, 29 U.S.C. § 436 (Supp. III, 1962).
91 See Aaron, The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 H~Av.
L. REv. 883-86 (1960).
92 "The privilege which exists as to private papers cannnot be maintained in relation to
'records required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information of transac-
tions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation ... '" 335 U.S. 1, 33
(1948).
93 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911).
94 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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privilege. Even if Shapiro should not be held controlling,95 access to the records
could be obtained by recourse to the immunity provisions of section 9(e) or
section 1954(b) of the Title 18 amendments.99
Sections 10 and 11 will also provide a needed incentive, particularly to
smaller plans, to keep records on a more businesslike basis. As Professor Patterson
has observed, such record keeping provisions are sometimes "the most useful
provisions of disclosure laws."97
Reliance on Administrative Interpretations: Section 12 (29 U.S.C.A. § 308(c))
Taken from the Portal to Portal Act,9" and also an entirely new provision,
section 12 provides that good faith reliance on an interpretation of the Act by
the Secretary of Labor shall be a bar to any liability for a failure to comply
with any provision of the Act. This provision will have importance, if any, as
a defense to private civil suits under section 9(b), since it is unlikely that the
Secretary himself would initiate such a suit, and the criminal penalties of
section 9(a) are already limited by a strict concept of willfulness, where a good
faith mistake of law would probably constitute a valid defense.99
Bonding: Section 13 (29 U.S.C.A. § 308(d))
Few individuals quarreled with the basic idea that bonds should be required
of the various plans' personnel. It is hard to understand, in fact, why such a
provision was not included in the original Act. Yet, section 13 underwent a
number of changes before its final form emerged. Now every administrator,
officer and employee of any benefit plan who handles the property of the plan
must be bonded. An exception, however, is made for the plan which is under-
written solely by the general assets of the union or employer. It was felt that
a "performance-type" bond was beyond the purpose of the statute.9 '
The Senate bonding provisions did not contain a bond ceiling; the House
provision fixed the upper limit at $500,000. Under the conference substitute
the amount of the bond must be fixed at the beginning of the plan's reporting
year. It must be not less than 10 per cent of the total funds handled, except
that it must be at least $1,000 and it need not exceed $500,000, except where,
after notice and hearing, the Secretary prescribes otherwise. The Conference
Report, moreover, makes it clear that the Secretary may require a bond in
excess of $500,000, yet not more than 10 per cent of the funds handled, "by
regulation prior to the effective date of the bonding requirements" or subse-
quently "on a case-by-case basis."'01
95 The decision rests on a precarious five-four basis. It is not entirely unlikely, therefore,
that "a more conservative Supreme Court might at any time adopt the minority view." DAVIS,
1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 203 (1958).
96 See infra at 280 and 285.
97 PATTERSON, LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PENSION EXPECTATIONS 201 (1960).
98 61 Stat. 88, 29 U.S.C. § 258 (1958).
99 See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
100 The final form of the language of the exception is based on an amendment offered by
Congressman Goodell in the House. 108 CONG. RnEc. 1847 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962.) Since the
Senate had a more flexible bonding provision, the same effect had been achieved through legis-
lative history. S. REP. No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1961). See also 108 CONG. REC.
1783 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962).
101 H.R. REP. No. 1417, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1962).
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Fortunately, Congress profited by the mistakes made in some of the "regret-
table"'0 2 draftsmanship in section 502 (a) of the L.M.R.D.A."'0 It is clear under
section 13 that the bond need only protect against fraud and dishonesty, and
it may be either an individual or a schedule bond. The surety must be an accept-
able surety on federal bonds under the authority granted to the Secretary of
Treasury pursuant to the Act of July 30, 1947,04 but the bond may not be
procured from any company or through any agent or broker in whose business
the plan or any party in interest has significant control or financial interest.
Responsibility for securing the bonds is placed both on the individual
handling the funds and the persons having- authority to direct them. The section
provides, however, that duplicate bonding shall not be required. Rather than
"extending to more people less stringent provision," as Congressman Ashbrook
observed,' this provision will have the desirable effect of making section 13,
not section 502 of the L.M.R.D.A.,0 - the bonding standard where union or
union-employer plans are involved. Consequently, the interpretative problems
noted above will no longer be significant. If not more protection, at least clearer
protection will be extended to the participants and beneficiaries. Under a Senate
amendment section 13 also empowers the Secretary to issue regulations on
bonding.'
Under an amendment offered by Congressman Jones of North Carolina
to the House bill, the Secretary could have exempted individuals from the
section where evidence of financial responsibility was offered.' A comparable
Senate provision only applied where other bonding arrangements were required
by federal or state law.' The conference substitute now permits the Secretary
to accept either other bonding arrangements or evidence of financial responsi-
bility. The intent of the provision is to permit the Secretary by regulation or on
a case-by-case basis to accept other forms of surety. Irrevocable escrow arrange-
ments or cash bonds are contemplated." 0 Insurance firms, such as Lloyds of
London, although not approved by the Secretary of the Treasury also could,
for example, continue to write bonds subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Labor.
102 See Aaron, supra note 91, at 895-97, and Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure-Act of 1959, 46 VA. L. Rav. 195, 228-30 (1960).
103 73 Stat. 536, 29 U.S.C. § 502(a) (Supp. III, 1962).
104 6 U.S.C. §§ 6-13 (1958).
105 108 CONG. REc. 1568 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1962).
106 See House 1961 Hearings at 408.
107 The Secretary has issued comprehensive regulations: governing procedures for seeking
and granting exemptions from the bonding requirements, 27 Fed. Reg. 8798 (1962); on basic
bonding requirements and definitions of terms involved therein, 27 Fed. Reg. 11803 (1962); and
concerning the prohibition against bonding by parties interested in the plan, 27 Fed. Reg. 10581
(1962). These add, respectively, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1307.1-.11, §§ 1306.1-.29, and §§ 1309.1-.4.
The latter states that not all "parties in interest" as defined in § 3(13) of the Act are disquali-
fied from providing or procuring bonds for the plan, specifically not where the "party in interest"
is such only because it provides multiple benefit plan services and the plan has availed itself
of other services provided by the party. This is said to be so because there is no distinction
between this type of relationship and the ordinary arm's length business relationship involved
in securing a bond.
108 108 CONG. REc. 1848 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962).
109 S. REP. No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1962).
110 H. R. REP. No. 1417, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1962).
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Effect of Other Laws: Section 16 (29 U.S.C.A. § 309)
Section 16 of the amended Act now provides that the provisions of section
13 of the Act, concerning bonding, are to pre-empt any other present or future
state or federal law affecting the operation or administration of employee welfare
or pension benefit plans. Pre-emption under the 1958 Act was expressly limited
to certain restrictions on duplication of report making, and this added exception
regarding bonding was the only change made in section 16 by the 1962 Amend-
ments. Thus section 16 still provides that, with these two exceptions, the amended
Act does not supersede any other state or federal law affecting the operation or
administration of benefit plans.
111
Advisory Council: Section 14 (29 U.S.C.A. § 308(e))
Largely taken from the original Douglas bill," 2 section 14, a new pro-
vision, sets up an Advisory Council to consult with and make recommendations
to the Secretary in the administration of the Act. The Council is composed of
representatives from the insurance and corporate trust field, management and
labor, and finally "other interested groups" and the general public. Voluntary,
nonprofit, prepayment medical plans are now, and actuaries, insurance con-
sultants and accountants may be in the future, represented as in the "interested
groups" category. The original Council appointments made in 1962 are for
two years. Section 14 also contains a requirement, included at the suggestion
of Congressman Goodell,"' that the Secretary send to Congress each year a
report covering the administration of the Act and the Council's recommen-
dations.
Administration: Section 15 (29 U.S.C.A. § 308(f))
Section 15 makes the Administrative Procedure Act "14 applicable to the
Act. Congressman Roosevelt's statements on the House floor make it clear that
the Act is to apply without exception." 5 It will have effect primarily on the
provisions throughout the Act requiring, prior to certain action, notice and
hearing and on the issuance of regulations. Few can object to following its
procedures."'
111 See People v. Automobile Transporters Welfare Fund, 235 N.Y.S.2d 702 (App. Div.
1962).
112 S. 2888, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1957).
113 108 CoNG. REc. 1848 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962). At the suggestion of Congressman
Goodell, an amendment was also included which limited the personnel and appropriation for
the first two years of the amended Act's administration. Ibid.
114 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958).
115 108 CONG. REC. 1564 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1962). It is questionable, however, that the
APA would apply to investigational hearings, as the legislative counsel to the Teamsters'
Union suggested, House 1961 Hearings at 224, particularly where the investigation is prelim-
inary to a referral to the Department of Justice and no adjudication or rule-making function is
involved. See Note, 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 77 (1959). On the other hand, strong argu-
ments have been advanced for applying the APA to these types of investigations. See Newman,
Federal Agency Investigations: Procedural Rights of the Subpoenaed Witness, 60 MicH. L.
REv. 169 (1961), and Rosenblum and Silverstein, Investigations Under Landrum-Griffin, 49
GEo. L. J. 283-93 (1960).
116 By General Order 15-62, 27 Fed. Reg. 4977 (1962), the Secretary of Labor established
the Office of Welfare and Pension Plans, and delegated to the Assistant Secretary for Labor-
Management Relations authority and responsibility for the performance of all functions as-
signed to the Secretary by the amended Act.
WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT
Section 15 also contains the final form of the so-called Ashbrook amend-
ment. Apparently catching the Democratic leadership by surprise, Representative
Ashbrook of Ohio proposed and secured the acceptance.. of a provision which
would have, in effect, prevented Department of Labor personnel engaged in
administrating the Act from affiliating with the AFL-CIO." 8 Congressman
Roosevelt of California described the amendment as an "anti-labor move straight
down the line.""' 9 As the provision finally emerged from the House-Senate
conference, out of an express desire to avoid conflicts of interest, 2 ' it prevented
Labor Department personnel from administering or enforcing the Act "with
respect to any employee organization of which he is a member or employer
organization in which he has an interest."''
Enforcement: Section 9 (20 U.S.C.A. § 308)
By far the most significant amendments were made to section 9. Now
section 9(a) applies not only to sections 5 and 8, but to the. entire Act, making
a "willful" violation of any provision subject to a fine of not more than $1,000
or imprisonment of not more than six months. The threat of a criminal action
under section 9(a), however, is not too potent. To date the Department of
Justice has not yet instituted a single prosecution, largely because of the strict
standard of willfulness embodied in the section.'2 2 The House report on the
original Act expressly stated that no penalty: "shall be enforced except for
deliberate defiance or persistent refusal in bad faith to comply with a clear
obligation imposed by the provisions of this Act."' 2 3
Section 9(b), originally the key to the individual enforcement concept of
the Act, has been retained. It provides that, upon request by a participant or
beneficiary, if an administrator shall fail or refuse to publish the description
or annual report within thirty days in accordance with section 8(a) (2), he
may become liable to that person for $50 per day. Section 9(c) provides that
an action for such liability can be maintained in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion. Reasonable attorney fees and costs may also be allowed.
Section 9(d) now spells out the scope of the investigative powers of the
Secretary of Labor. Over the strong objection of Secretary Goldberg,'24 both
the House and the Senate attempted to put definite limits on those powers.
When the administrative agencies first appeared, in the early part of the 1900's,
courts looked with some suspicion on their investigative power. FTC v. American
Tobacco Co.,'25 is perhaps the leading case which attemped to place limitations
on the administrative "fishing expedition." Despite judicial disfavor, Congress
117 The amendment was passed by a vote of 105 to 79. 108 CONG. REc. 1846 (daily ed.
Feb. 7, 1962).
118 108 CONG. REc. 3896 (daily ed. March 15, 1962).
119 Id. at 3898.'
120 H. R. REP. No. 1417, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1962).
121 Section 15(b).
122 House 1961 Hearings at 256.
123 H. R. REP. No. 2283, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1958). It should also be noted that this
expression of intent applies to civil penalties as well. Ibid.
124 Senate 1961 Hearings at 10.
125 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
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enacted again and again broad grants of investigative authority. Finally, in
Oklahoma Press v. Walling,"' the right of free access to records for legitimate
investigative purposes was upheld. Section 9(d) is the first instance since the
beginning of administrative investigations in which Congress, and not the courts,
has attempted to circumscribe such investigations.
Under section 9(d) the Secretary can initiate upon complaint or his own
motion civil investigations only where he has "reasonable cause" to believe such
an investigation may reveal a violation of the Act. Moreover, where section 7
is concerned, a certification must first be requested.' After such certification,
if the Secretary continues to have "reasonable cause," the investigation may
be conducted. The key to any investigation will be, of course, the meaning
of "reasonable cause." It can be expected, therefore, that one of the first cases
under the new amendments will concern an attempt to articulate a workable
definition of the phrase. Congressman Ashbrook of Ohio is wrong when he
asserts that it is synonymous "with anything and everything."'2 8 Senator Mc-
Namara's discussion of the phrase is much closer to the heart of the matter.
Unquestionably, it will be the starting point for any court faced with a concrete
case to decide. Recognizing that it is a "term of art" neither too discretionary
nor too restrictive, he observed:
It certainly prevents the Secretary from embarking on a
"fishing expedition," that perennial horror of private lawyers.
But it does not mean that the Secretary must have in hand
before his investigation, the evidence he seeks to find by his
investigation.
It will be sufficient for him to find, on a reasonable basis,
that an investigation may reveal a violation of the act.
Thus he will not be required to possess the powers of prophecy,
only the sense of justice that our courts have required of those who
guard the public interest.129
On the other hand, it must be recognized that the phrase's lack of precision
will permit the skilled but not too ethical attorney to impede at the outset
every legitimate investigation by the Secretary of Labor by taking each sub-
poena to court and pushing all possible appeals to their utmost. For this reason,
it is certainly to be hoped that the courts called upon to enforce subpoenae
will handle them realistically and expeditiously. 3 '
Section 9(e) makes the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act
of 1914 dealing with the attendance of witnesses and the production of docu-
ments applicable to the investigations conducted by the Secretary. As originally
proposed, section 9(e) had incorporated, at the suggestion of the Department
of Justice,"' the similar provisions of the Federal Power Act of 1920."' The
substitution was made to reassure some House members that the investigative
126 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
127 S. REP. No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1961).
128 107 CONo. Rae. 17115 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1961).
129 108 CONG. REC. 1748 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962).
130 See Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production of Docu-
ments, 60 Micn. L. REv. 187 (1961), for a review of the practice of federal courts during the
past twelve years.
131 108 CONG. REc. 1841 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962).
132 49 Stat. 856, 16 U.S.C. § 825(f),(g) (1958).
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powers of the Secretary would not by reference be enlarged. 3 ' Unfortunately,
the only real effect of the substitution is to make a plea of possible self-incrimina-
tion unnecessary in order for a witness to obtain immunity for testimony in
obedience to a subpoena.'
Section 9(f) provides that the Secretary can obtain under appropriate
circumstances both permanent and temporary injunctions in federal courts.
Once obtained, the injunctions can be enforced, of course, by both civil and
criminal contempt proceedings.' Unlike the L.M.R.D.A., 30 the amendments
unfortunately do not provide for jury trials where the criminal contempt alter-
native is chosen. Section 9(g) grants appropriate federal courts jurisdiction
to hear suits under the section.
For the benefit of those not familiar with the legislative history of the Act
and the 1962 Amendments, section 9(h) spells out in so many words that the
Secretary of Labor is not to regulate or interfere in the management of the
various plans. Section 9(i) represents another manifestation of distrust in the
Department of Labor. It was included to guarantee "that there could never be
a cover up of any nature by any future Secretary of Labor."'' The section makes
explicit the duty of the Secretary to transmit to the Attorney General any infor-
mation warranting consideration for criminal prosecution.
E. AMENDMENTS TO THE CRIMINAL CODE
In extensively rewriting the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act,
Congress also enacted three new criminal statutes, dealing with: (1) false
statements and concealment of facts in relation to documents required by the
Act, '3 (2) embezzlement and theft from plans subject to the Act,3 9 and (3)
bribery and graft occurring in the administration of such plans. 40
1. Section 1027
Largely on the assumption that existing law was adequate,' 4' although
the Douglas bill specifically dealt with the problem, 41 the Teller bill in 1958
did not contain any provision dealing with false statements. As the Act finally
emerged from conference, however, the general federal false statement provision
was explicitly made applicable' 4 Still, it remained an open question how
133 108 CONG. REc. 1841 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962).
134 United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1942). To the degree that an embezzlement
would involve a false report and consequently a willful violation of the Act under section 9(a),
the administrative immunity provision of the Secretary of Labor could be used by the Depart-
ment of Justice in enforcing § 664 of the Title 18 amendments. See Goldberg v. Battles,
196 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 299 F.2d 937 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 817
(1962). The immunity provisions of the L.M.R.D.A., which parallel the new provisions of the
amended Act, are discussed at length in Rosenblum and Silverstein, supra note 115.
135 See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1946).
136 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. § 528 (Supp. III, 1962).
137 108 CONG. REC. 1841 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962).
138 76 Stat. 42 (1962), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1027 (Supp. 1962).
139 76 Stat. 42 (1962), 18 U.S.C.A. § 664 (Supp. 1962).
140 76 Stat. 42 (1962), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1954 (Supp. 1962).
141 H. R. REP. No. 2656, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1958).
142 S. 2888, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(b) (1957).
143 Section 9(e) of the 1958 Act, 72 Stat. 1002, made 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958), the general
provision regulating to false statements in any matter within the jurisdiction of any agency of
the United States, applicable to descriptions and annual reports under the Act.
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section 1001 could be applied to the Act."' Section 1027 is apparently designed
to answer objections to the former arrangement145 and guarantee that false
statements in the various documents required by the Act will be subject to stiff
criminal sanctions.
Representative Hiestand of California is right in his criticism when he
observes that it is difficult "to make sense out of" the new provision. 4 ' Upon
a close reading, however, its meaning becomes evident. It applies across the
board to "any person"; it is not limited, for example, to plan personnel. It
deals, moreover, with three categories of information: (1) that contained in
documents required "to be published," which would include the description,
annual report and summary under section 8(a); (2) that contained in docu-
ments required to be "kept" under section 11, which would include such
records as vouchers, worksheets, and receipts needed to verify, explain, or clarify
the description or the annual report; and (3) that required to be "certified"
by insurance carriers under section 7 (g) or by public accountants under
section 7(b). Any knowing false statement or concealment in any of these
would subject the person to a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment
for not more than five years, or both.
Section 1027 differs from the general false statement provision in a number
of respects. Unlike section 1001, it does not require that a particular false
statement be made "willfully." The difference is probably more apparent than
real, since "willful" within section 1001 does not denote "evil purpose."'4
7
Section 1001, unlike section 1027, also requires that the false statement be
"material." Again, however, the difference may be more apparent than real.
"Materiality" within section 1001 is governed by the same test used in perjury
cases. 34  There the term has been so broadened that "it might as well be
omitted from the statute."'4 9 We can conclude, therefore, that the new section
makes few, if any, substantial changes in existing law. Its major contribution
will be to specify in detail the kinds of documents to which it applies.
2. Section 644
Both the Douglas bill 5 . and the Administration proposal 5 ' in 1957 included
a provision prohibiting the embezzlement of the funds of a benefit plan. Un-
fortunately, the Teller bill and the Act as it finally emerged from conference
did not deal with the problem. But section 644 as it now stands is little more
144 Making the statute applicable through an explicit incorporation still did not answer
Congresswoman Green's objection founded on the lack of administrative functions within the
Department of Labor. See H. R. REP. No. 2283, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1958).
145 The objections were, in fact, removed when the Secretary of Labor was given adminis-
trative functions. Consequently, there is much truth in the observation that section 1027 was
not needed legislation.
146 107 CONG. REc. 17115 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1961).
147 Corcoran v. United States, 229 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1956).
148 Compare Carroll v. United States, 16 F.2d 951 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763.
(1927), with Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
878 (1961).
149 Lillich, The Element of Materiality in the Federal Crime of Perjury, 35 IND. L.J. 1, 2
(1959).
150 S. 2888, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(d) (1957).
151 S. 2175, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1957).
WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT
than a carbon copy of its counterpart in the Douglas bill. It makes any person
who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or converts any
of the moneys, funds, securities, premiums, credits, or other assets of a benefit
plan subject to the Act 52 liable for a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment for not
more than five years, or both.
By and large there was little real opposition to the inclusion of an em-
bezzlement provision among the 1962 amendments, although in 1957... and
in 1961' objections had been made to the language of the provisions, particular-
ly the phrase "abstracts or converts," on the ground that they were too vague
and indefinite. The objections, however, are fairly met by the memorandum
filed by the Department of Justice in 1957"5' and the testimony of its Criminal
Division in 1961.5 While fine distinctions are inappropriate to consolidated
offenses,15 it should not be concluded that statutes such as section 644 are
without definite meaning. "Abstract' 5 8 and "convert"' 59 are both terms which
have been subject to adjudication and definition by appellate courts. There is
little danger, moreover, of an otherwise innocent transaction being caught up
in such a statute, since it is clear that wrongful intention would be held to be
the core of the crime.'
3. Section 1954
At the suggestion of the Securities and Exchange Commission,1 ' when
the Douglas bill was reported in 1957 it included a provision dealing with the
bribery of certain persons connected with benefit plans.'62 As finally enacted
in 1962, however, section 1954 is based only in part on the Douglas bill. It
actually bears a closer kinship 65 to section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act.'64
Like section 302, it is designed to deal with what Judge Hand aptly described as:
what has been done, time out of mind, when one person, knowing
that he is likely to have continuous dealing with another, in which
the second person will be acting as a fiduciary, wishes to insure a
friendly approach to the fiduciary; and makes him presents or does
him favors, or in other and less palpable forms tries to turn the edge
of his allegiance. 165
152 Constitutionally, therefore, the provision, like the Act itself, rests on the commerce
clause. Section 501(c) of the L.M.R.D.A, has a similar constitutional base which has been
affirmed on appeal as fully constitutional. Lawson v. United States, 300 F.2d 252 (10th Cir.
1962).
153 Senate 1957 Hearings at 443.
154 House 1961 Hearings at 235.
155 Hearings before the House Committee on Education and Labor, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
87 (1957).
156 House 1961 Hearings at 261.
157 United States v. Page, 277 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1960).
158 United States v. Northway, 120 U.S. 327 (1887); Williams v. United States, 275 Fed.129 (6th Cir. 1921).
159 Hubbard v. United States, 79 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1935).
160 Dobbins v. United States, 157 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 734 (1946).
161 Senate 1957 Hearings at 66.
162 S. 2888, 85th 'Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(e) (1957). The section did not include "because
of" language; see note 167 infra.
163 See S. REP. No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1961).
164 Ch. 120, § 302, 61 Stat. 157 (1947) (now 29 U.S.C. § 186 (Supp. III, 1962)).
165 United States v. Ryan, 225 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion), rev'd,
350 U.S. 299 (1956).
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Section 1954 begins by setting out four categories of fiduciaries: (1) persons
associated with the plan; (2) persons associated with an employer connected
with the plan; (3) persons associated with an employee organization connected
with the plan; and (4) persons associated with an organization, such as an
accounting or investment brokerage firm, 6 ' which provides benefit plan services
to the plans. It then attempts to insulate those fiduciaries from both graft and
outright bribery6 7 by prohibiting them from receiving, agreeing to receive, or
soliciting any fee, kickback, commission, gift, loan, money, or thing of value.'
Under the section, graft encompasses all of the above transactions entered into
"because of . . . actions, decisions, or other duties" of the fiduciary relating to
the plan. A bribe, on the other hand, would be committed where the fiduciary
entered into the particular transaction "with intent to be influenced with
respect to" any of his similar actions, decisions or other duties. On the face
of the statute, both graft and bribery are subject to a fine of $10,000 and/or
imprisonment for not more than three years. Congress has apparently left it up
to the judiciary to distinguish between outright bribery and the less serious
taking of graft where punishment is concerned.
The Department of Justice has also been entrusted with a measure of
flexibility; a specific intent to influence will have to be shown only where it is
charged. Consequently, the Department can be expected to move under the
less stringent graft language in situations actually involving bribery but other-
wise not suitable for prosecution because of a lack of evidence on the issue of
intent. The Department has assured Congress, however, that the provision will
be used against conflict of interest payments only in relatively more complex
and sophisticated situations.' 9
The distinction between the graft-type transaction and the outright bribe
is not without other important differences. A conviction for having accepted
graft probably would not constitute a conviction of "bribery" within section 504
of the L.M.R.D.A., which disqualifies persons convicted of certain crimes,
including bribery, from service as a union officer or a labor relations consultant
for five years after their release from prison.' Since a graft-type conviction
could be obtained without proof of an intent to influence, the touchstone of
the traditional definition of bribery,'' it would probably not be held a dis-
qualifying conviction for "bribery" within the meaning of section 504.
166 See S. REP. No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1961).
167 The statute reads "because of or with intent to be influenced with respect to," indicating
alternative circumstances under which the statute may be violated. (Emphasis added.) See
Adolfson v. United States, 159 F.2d 883 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 818 (1947). The
phraseology is based on similar bribery provisions of Chapter 11, Title 18, United States Code.
See, e.g., Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 206, 62 Stat. 692; compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 (f)-(i)
with 18 U.S.C.A. § 201(b)-(e) (Supp. 1962). The intent of Congress was to go beyond a
strict "influence-type" statute. STAFF OF SUBCOMm. No. 5, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
85TH CONG., 2D SEss., FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LEGISLATION 67 (1958).
168 The comparable provision in H. R. 8723 did not include agents of plans; officers,
counsels, agents and employees of organizations providing benefit plan services; or counsels
of employers and employee organizations. Solicitations, fees, kickbacks, commissions, gifts and
loans were also not expressly included. H. R. REP. No. 1417, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1962).
169 See S. REP. No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1961).
170 73 Stat. 536, 29 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. III, 1962).
171 PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 406-07 (1957).
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Any person who gives or offers any fee, kickback, or other thing of value
prohibited by section 1954 is similarly subject to fine or imprisonment. Largely
to protect individuals providing benefit plans with professional advice,"7 2 the
section excludes the payment of bona fide salary, compensation, or other pay-
ment for goods, facilities, or services actually furnished or performed in the
regular course of the individual fiduciary's duties.173
At the suggestion of the Department of Justice, 74 the section also includes
an immunity provision, obviously patterned after section 1406 of the Narcotics
Control Act,' which can be used to compel testimony or the production of
records in grand jury or court proceedings in the face of a plea of possible
self-incrimination. Like section 1406,"6 the provision will unquestionably be
construed to protect persons compelled to give testimony from both state and
federal prosecutions. 7 For those concerned by any attempt to circumvent the
fifth amendment, there is some consolation in the requirement of the provision
that it be used only after the Attorney General himself approves the grant on a
case-by-case basis.'
F. CONCLUSION
Over-all criticism of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, even
as amended, must begin by noting the continuing inadequacy of its disclosure
provisions. They are inadequate precisely because they do not require full and
complete disclosure. It is clear that strong sanctions now exist which can,
if used, deal well enough with such abuses as double dealing and outright
thievery. Vigorous prosecution7 . and adequate bonding will do about all that
law can do where basic dishonesty is involved. Of greater importance to the
ultimate beneficiary, however, is the possibility of incompetent, imprudent or
irresponsible management. Only detailed regulation or detailed disclosure can
deal with these problems, if they can be dealt with at all. A sound investment
plan, for example, could perhaps be guaranteed by exposing the administrator's
or* trustee's judgment to public criticism or by articulating in detail a mass
of regulations and guidelines. For those concerned with maintaining a healthy
balance between private and public judgment, however, disclosure - effective
disclosure -is the only acceptable alternative. The present Act, by requiring
only category disclosure, and not touching many areas of plan management,
adopts neither approach.
Category disclosure ignores as well the problem of the concentration of
172 See House 1961 Hearings -at 233.
173 The language originally proposed excepted such payments for "necessary services."
H. R. 7235, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 17(a) (1961). At the suggestion of the legislative counsel
of the Teamsters, the phrase was omitted. House 1961 Hearings at 234.
174 H. R. REP. No. 998, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1961).
175 18 U.S.C. § 1406 (1958).
176 See Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960).
177 See S. REP. No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1961).
178 108 CONG. Rc. 1752 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962).
179 The Title 18 provisions will be administered by the Department of Justice. Investiga-
tions under the provisions, moreover, will be conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and/or federal grand jurieg. See House 1961 Hearings at 256-57. Interestingly enough, grand
jury investigations are not limited by "reasonable cause" requirements. See Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919). Recognizing this fact brings into stronger relief the distrust man-
ifested by Congress in the Office of the Secretary of Labor.
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financial power. Largely unasked and unanswered is the question of what
effect on our private economy and personal freedom will result from the accel-
erating trend toward institutional holding of private property, of which the
benefit plan, particularly the self-insured pension trust, is perhaps the best
illustration.
Traditionally, America has been committed to an economic system based
on the private ownership of property, fundamentally because of a belief that
private ownership promotes individual freedom. These benefit programs have
today amassed, and are amassing, vast aggregates of wealth upon which many
have claims, but of which no one can call himself owner. The old analysis that
the rise of the corporation has resulted in a separation and dilution of ownership
and control must now be supplemented by the recognition of a new merger
of legal ownership and, perhaps, control in the benefit plan trustee; it is a
sobering observation indeed that 90 per cent of the assets of self-insured
pension plans are held by eight or nine New York banks.' Little information
is possessed on how this trust is being exercised. Likewise, the mere allegations
surrounding the Montgomery Ward and New York Central proxy fights are
disturbing.'
What is needed in the area of these programs is the clear recognition that
those who administer the various plans occupy positions of public trust. They
must account to the larger community from whom they obtain their position
for the administration of this stewardship. Private economic power like public
political power must be held accountable. The real challenge of the benefit
plan is to achieve this goal short of the twin evils of pluralistic anarchy or state
authoritarianism.
Criticism of the Act must also note the failure to deal with such problems
as termination, amendment, eligibility, actuarial soundness, vesting, legal enforce-
ability of individual rights; and the interrelation of the plans and Social Security,
the equity market, economic growth and inflation. It may well be that the Act
is most notable for what it has not done. These areas are certainly crucial
problems of concern, which should at least occupy the attention of the new
Advisory Council.
On the other hand, political realities and public understanding must also
be seen for what they are. Few of the participants- government, employers,
unions, or beneficiaries- have developed to date any articulate understanding
of what they are doing. 2 Under these circumstances, the present Act is prob-
ably the best that could be obtained at this time. Witness the fate of the
Douglas bill. It may well be, moreover, that it is too soon to expect any
definitive treatment of the problem. The disclosure provisions, as inadequate
as they are, the record keeping requirements and the bonding and criminal
180 BERLE, ECONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SOCIETY 11 (1957).
Society ser. 1957).
181 See generally, Stock Market Study (Corporate Proxy Contests), Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3
(1956).
182 See I-ARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 73-121 (1959).
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provisions, given effective administration,' will go a long way toward securing
a greater measure of security for the beneficiaries of the various benefit plans
than existed before the Act. Ultimately, it must be recognized that all of the
problems implicit in the development of the benefit plan cannot be solved by
the enactment of any single law. Professor Patterson's reference.8 4 to Oliver
Goldsmith is in point:
How small, of all that human hearts endure,
That part which laws or king can cause or cure.
183 Unfortunately, 'too little consideration was given to the effect which its administering of
yet another law like the L.M.R.D.A. will have on the historic relation of the Department of
Labor to the labor movement. Congressman Kearns is perhaps right when he asks that con-
sideration should be given to a -reorganization of the Department. 108 CONG. R c. 1849
(daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962).
184 PATTERSON, LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PENSION EXPECTATIONS 256 (1960).
